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The Innocence Protection Act: Why Federal
Measures Requiring Post-Conviction DNA Testing
and Preservation of Evidence are Needed in Order
to Reduce the Risk of Wrongful Executions
"I believe there are cases where the death penalty is appropri-
ate. But we've got to make sure we have the right person.
Every governor who holds this power has the same fear I do. "1
PART I: INTRODUCTION
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, 731 men and
women have been executed in the United States2, including forty-
eight prisoners put to death from January through August of 2001
alone. 3 During this time, ninety-six people 4 - more than one out
of every 100 people sentenced to death in the United States
5 -
have been exonerated after spending years in prison or on death
row for crimes they did not commit.6 Of these exonerations, eighty-
1 Statement by George Ryan, Republican Governor of Illinois, who, in Jan-
uary of 2000 imposed a moratorium on capital punishment after 13 men were re-
leased from death row after proving they were wrongly convicted. Jonathan
Adler, NEWSWEEK, The Death Penalty on Trial, June 4, 2000 at 3, 7, available at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/418243.asp (last visited Sept. 9, 2000).
2 See Death Penalty Information Center, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/
dpicexec.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2001).
3 See Brooke A. Masters, Executions Decrease for the 2
"d Year; Va., Texas
Show Sharp Drops Amid a National Trend, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at A01.
4 See Hearing on Protecting the Innocent. Ensuring Competent Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases, 1 07 1h Cong. (1S Sess. 2001) (statement of Patrick Leahy, Sena-
tor, Vermont). See also Raymond Bonner, Death Row Inmate is Freed After DNA
Test Clears Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at All.
5 See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before
the House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 106th Cong. (2
"d Sess. 2000) [hereinafter
Hearings] (statement of Honorable William D. Delahunt, Representative, Massa-
chusetts). See also Rhonda McMillion, Pulling the Plug on Executions: ABA's Call
for Death Penalty Moratorium Sparks Debate in Congress, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2000, at
99.
6 See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt). See
also Alan Berlow, The Wrong Man, at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/9nov/
9911wrongman.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2001) (explaining that "[t]he reasons for
these miscarriages of justice range from simple police and prosecutorial error to
the most outrageous misconduct, such as the framing of innocent people, and eve-
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two people, including ten on death row, were proven innocent by
post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid testing (hereinafter referred
to as "DNA testing"). 7 In at least seventeen of the exonerations,
DNA testing not only proved the innocence of convicted men and
women, but also led to the identification of the real perpetrators. 8
While these figures may indicate that our judicial system may
be on the right track in utilizing DNA technology in criminal cases,
the truth is that many convicted men and women request DNA test-
ing every year to prove their innocence, but their requests are de-
nied due to post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions.9 In almost
half of the post-conviction exonerations based on DNA evidence,
state prosecutors refused to release evidence for DNA testing until
litigation was threatened or initiated. 10 Prisoners who are forced to
litigate in order to obtain DNA testing face an average delay of 4.5
years, increasing the likelihood that biological evidence will be lost
or destroyed.11
rything in between: perjured testimony, erroneous eyewitness testimony, false con-
fessions (including the confessions of innocent defendants), racial bias,
incompetent defense counsel, and overzealous police officers and prosecutors who
may or may not genuinely believe that they have the perpetrator of a heinous
crime").
7 See Mark Hansen, The Great Detective, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2001, at 37, 42-44.
See also Kay Lazar, Tiny Evidence Changing the Face of the Criminal Justice Sys-
tem, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 24, 2000, at 8 (explaining that Deoxyribonucleic Acid
(DNA) is a cellular acid that carries a person's genetic code). See also Andrew
Olivastro, DNA Testing Creates Second Chances, at http://www.policy.com/news/
dbrief/dbriefarc695.asp (last visited Sept. 5, 2000) (stating that if a person's DNA
does not match the DNA left in biological evidence left at a crime scene, he or she
may be exonerated).
8 See Hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform Sub-
committee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmen-
tal Relations: DNA Technologies, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) (statement of Barry C.
Scheck, Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law).
9 See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on S. 2073 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 106" Cong. (21d Sess. 2000) (statement of Bryan Ste-
phenson, Executive Director, Equal Justice Initiative of Alabama). See also JIM
DWYER, PETER NEUFELD, & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS
TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGFULLY CONVICTED
218 (2000) (stating that "[I]n thirty-three states, any claim of innocence based on
new evidence must be brought to court within six months of the final appeal. Only
seven states permit the motion at any time" ).
10 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at xvi.
11 See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on S. 2073 Before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 106"' Cong. ( 2 nd Sess. 2000) (statement of Peter
Neufeld, Co-Director, Innocence Project, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law;
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In order to stop this injustice, a bi-partisan bill called the Inno-
cence Protection Act of 2001 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act")
has been introduced to the Senate and to the House of Representa-
tives.12 The Act is a collection of measures aimed at reducing the
imprisonment and execution of innocent people.13 The Act would
apply to all federal inmates and would require all states to either
adopt the provisions set forth in the Act or create similar legislation
of their own. 14 States refusing to comply would do so at the risk of
losing grants for DNA programs.
15
Commissioner, New York State Forensic Science Commission; co-author, ACTUAL
INNOCENCE).
12 S. 486, 1 07 h Cong. (P
t Sess. 2001) introduced to the Senate on March 7,
2001 (S. 486 was originally introduced to the Senate during the 10 6 h Cong. (2 nd
Sess. 2000) as S. 2073, by Senator Patrick Leahy, D-VT on February 10, 2000), and
H.R. 912, 107" Cong. (1st Sess. 2001) introduced to the House on March 7, 2001
(H.R. 912 was originally introduced to the House during 106"h Cong. (2 d Sess.
2000) by Congressman William D. Delahunt, D-MA on April 4, 2000).
13 See Amy Worden, Crime Bill Pushed in Last Month of Congress; APB
Online, Inc., available at www.apbonline.com (last visited Sept. 8, 2000) (stating
"[tihe Innocence Protection Act ... [is] a package of reforms aimed at reducing
the risk of wrongful execution. It would allow convicted offenders to prove their
innocence through DNA testing, help states provide competent legal services and
enable those who prove their innocence to receive compensation for their
incarceration").
14 See David E. Rovella, Fixing the Penalty: Democrats Push DNA Testing
Bill to Prevent Wrongful Executions, but GOP is Wary; NAT'L L.J., Vol. 22, No. 44,
June 26, 2000, at Al. Under Article 1, Section 8, Clause 18 of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, Congress has the power to enact laws in order to enforce its constitutionally
vested powers. U.S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 18. If Congress is seeking an objective
that is within the specifically enumerated powers, then Congress can use any
means that is (1) rationally related to the objective Congress is trying to achieve;
and (2) it must not violate any specific constitutional provision. See also McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (explaining that Congress may not enact legis-
lation in order to regulate a general police power). See e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (stating that Congress may use its taxing and spending powers to
"provide for the defense and general welfare of the United States .. "). U.S.
CoNsT. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congressional condi-
tions placed upon the distribution of federal funds to the states is usually justified
under the Necessary and Proper clause. See e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203 (1987) (holding that the withholding of federal highway funds from states that
allow individuals under the age of twenty-one to purchase or possess alcoholic
beverages is a permissible use of Congress' spending power).
15 See A Real Crime Bill, WASH. PosT, July 3, 2001, at A18. See also Bruce
Alpert, Congress May Mandate Use of DNA Tests in Some Criminal Cases, NEW-
HOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 29, 2000 (stating that under "Leahy's bill, states could
lose federal grants if they either deny reasonable requests for DNA testing that
could produce evidence of guilt or innocence or if they don't adopt adequate pro-
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A significant portion of the Act deals with DNA testing, nota-
bly providing post-conviction DNA testing to inmates and ensuring
the preservation of biological evidence for the term of an inmate's
sentence.'16 This Note will focus on the proposed legislation regard-
ing these issues. Part II discusses the history and background of the
Act. Part III illustrates the effect the Act will have on current fed-
eral law. Part IV describes the effect the Act will have on current
state law. Part V explains why it is necessary and proper for federal
legislation to be enacted to ensure that the federal government and
the states will take the appropriate steps in allowing post-conviction
DNA testing and the preservation of biological materials. Part VI
examines the effect of similar legislation currently enacted in states
such as New York, Illinois and California. Part VI also explores
recent legislation passed in Texas and Virginia - two states that
have staunchly maintained the strictest post-conviction laws in the
country.
cedures for preserving DNA material"). Because of the increasing use of DNA
testing in crime solving, the availability of federal funds is paramount. As of June,
2001, all fifty states have enacted statutes that require the collection of DNA from
persons convicted of sex crimes; thirty-four states require the collection of DNA
from persons convicted of serious crimes, in addition to sex crimes; twenty-six
states have laws requiring DNA to be collected from juvenile offenders; eighteen
states have access to the FBI's DNA index; and last year, at least nine states
changed their DNA collection statues to include most crimes. Hearing Before the
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government EJffi-
ciency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations: DNA Technolo-
gies, 1 07 th Cong. (1St Sess. 2001) (statement of Mike Lawlor, Representative, Chair
of Judiciary). Due to increased testing, many states have turned to the federal
government for help. For example, last year, California, Florida, Minnesota, New
York, Pennsylvania, Texas and Washington were the recipients of more that $7
million from the U.S. Department of Justice for DNA sample analysis.). Id.
16 H.R. 912, tit. I; S. 486, tit. I. See also Joe Volk, Executive Secretary of The
Friends Committee on National Legislation; Letter to Sens. Feinstein and Schumer:
Support the Innocence Protection Act, Sept. 15, 2000, available at http://
www.fcnl.org/issues/cri/sup/deathfeinstein.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2000) (stating
that ". . . [t]he Innocence Protection Act's broader language with regard to DNA
evidence would provide more protection for the innocent. Defendant's would be
able to request DNA evidence that 'may produce noncumulative, exculpatory evi-
dence relevant to the claim of the applicant that the applicant was wrongfully con-
victed or sentenced' . . . [and] calls for the preservation of 'any biological material
secured in connection with a criminal case for such period of time as any person
remains incarcerated in connection with that case'.").
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While the Act's requirement for state compliance may be con-
sidered a broad act of federalism, 17 its measures are necessary in
order to protect innocent people from wrongful convictions and ex-
ecutions.18 Although several states have adopted measures similar
to those proposed in the Act, 19 the flat-out refusal by some states
20
to recognize or create similar legislation makes it clear that federal
intervention is needed to reduce the risk of incarcerating or execut-
ing innocent people.
21
PART II: HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE
INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT
In 1997, the House of Delegates of the American Bar Associa-
tion adopted a report from the ABA Section of Individual Rights
and Responsibilities and called for a nationwide moratorium on the
death penalty.22 Furthermore, the ABA urged the federal govern-
ment and the thirty-eight states with the death penalty to tempora-
17 See e.g., 30 Attorneys General Sign Letter Expressing DNA Testing Bill
Concerns; National Association of Attorneys General Home Page, at http://
www.naag.org/legislation/june/dna.html (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
18 The Innocence Protection Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before the
House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 10 6th Cong. 2nd Sess. (2000) (statement of
Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General), 2000 WL 19304895 (stating that
"[w]hile I appreciate and respect the federalism concerns raised by my colleagues
in state government, DNA testing is too important to allow some states to offer no
remedy to those incarcerated who may be innocent of the crimes for which they
were convicted"). It should also be noted that, according to a Newsweek poll,
almost 90% of Americans support the idea of federal guarantees of DNA testing.
Adler, supra note 1.
19 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer), (describing
New York Criminal Procedure Law §440.30 as authorizing New York trial courts
to order post-conviction DNA testing when it determines that: 1) the evidence
containing DNA was secured in connection with the trial resulting in the judgment;
and 2) that if a DNA test had been concluded on such evidence that the results had
been admitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, "there exists a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been more favorable to the defendant").
20 See Daniel B. Wood, DNA Testing: No Longer Just for Prosecutors, CHRIS-
TIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 18, 2000, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/
2000/09/18/p3sl.htm, (last visited Oct. 25, 2000). Seven states, including Delaware,
Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey and South Dakota have re-
jected legislation guaranteeing inmate access to DNA testing. Robert Tanner,
States are Slow to Grant DNA Testing to People Seeking to Prove Innocence, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2000, at A10.
21 See generally, Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stephenson).
22 Michael L. Radelet & Hugo Adam Bedau, ABA's Proposed Moratorium:
The Execution of the Innocent; 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1998). See also
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rily halt executions until they could ensure fairness in capital cases
and reduce the risk of executing the innocent. 23 The ABA's motion
was supported by twenty former ABA presidents - many of whom
considered themselves death penalty supporters.
24
On January 31, 2000, Illinois Governor George Ryan, citing Il-
linois' "shameful record of convicting innocent people and putting
them on death row,"' 25 imposed the nation's first moratorium on
executions. 26 Governor Ryan, a death penalty proponent,27 an-
nounced his decision after thirteen men were exonerated and freed
from death row in Illinois.28 These thirteen men represented more
than half of all death penalty sentences in Illinois since the state
reinstated capital punishment in 1977.29 Explaining his decision to
issue the moratorium, Governor Ryan stated that he was no longer
able to "support a system which, in its administration, has proven so
fraught with error, and has come so close to the ultimate
nightmare." 30
Mark Hansen, More for Moratorium: ABA Conference Bolsters Momentum to
Halt Executions, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 92.
23 See Sara Rimer, Support for a Moratorium In Executions Gets Stronger:
Growing Number of Cities Express Unease, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2000, at A-18.
See also McMillion, supra note 5.
24 Radelet & Bedau, supra note 22, at 105.
25 Morton Mintz, #15 Mort Wants to Know: Death Penalty Madness -
Shouldn't the Press Be Asking Hard Questions About Death Row In-Justice?, at
http://www.tompaine.com/news/2000/03/17/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2000).
26 Id.
27 Adina Yoffie, Fatal Error. The State of the US Death-Penalty System, at
http://www.princeton.edu/-progrev/99-00/n7-ay.html (visited Oct. 5, 2000)
28 Mintz, supra note 25. In addition to the release of thirteen prisoners from
death row, Ryan was also concerned with the findings of an investigation of the
Chicago Tribune. The investigation found that thirty-three death row inmates in
Illinois had been represented at trial by an attorney who had been disbarred;
thirty-five African-American death row inmates had been convicted by all white
juries; and that jailhouse informants were used to convict or condemn forty-six
death row inmates. See The Innocence Protection Act of 2000. Hearings on H.R.
4167 Before the House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 10 6th Cong. (2 d Sess. 2000)
(statement of Governor George H. Ryan, State of Illinois). Interestingly, five of
the men released from death row were not set free because of a properly working
judicial system. Instead, their freedom was due to a group of Northwestern Uni-
versity journalism students who, while working with an investigator, found evi-
dence of the men's innocence. See Berlow, supra note 6.
29 See Mintz, supra note 25.
30 Id. Unfortunately, the "ultimate nightmare" has occurred in the United
States - possibly several times. One study has shown that 23 innocent people
have been executed in the United States during the 20' century, including one in
1984. See Bedau & Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
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The day after Governor Ryan issued the moratorium, Senator
Patrick Leahy (D-VT) announced that he would introduce "the
first federal legislation to address denials of fundamental fairness in
the administration of capital punishment."' 31 Ten days later in the
Senate, on February 10, 2000, Senator Leahy introduced S. 2073,
The Innocence Protection Act of 2000.32 On April 4, 2000, Con-
gressmen William Delahunt (D-MA) and Ray LaHood (R-IL) in-
troduced H.R. 4167 - also called The Innocence Protection Act -
to the House of Representatives. 33 By the end of the 10 6th Con-
gress, the Act had not been submitted to a vote in either the Senate
or House. The Act was reintroduced to the 107Th Congress as S. 486
and H.R. 4167 on March 7, 2001.
34
The legislation proposed by the Act "arose out of a growing
national awareness that the machinery by which capital cases [are
tried] in this country has gone seriously awry."' 35 In the Act, the
drafters made several findings that proved that there were serious
problems with the current federal and state systems of criminal jus-
tice. 36 Notably, the Act points out that in most states, a motion for
STAN. L. REV., 21, 36, 173-179 (1987) and M. RADELET, H. BEDAU & C. PUTNAM,
IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE, 282-356 (1992). See also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Not all people see the execution of an inno-
cent person as the ultimate nightmare. See Edward Pratt, DNA Testing is a Good
Move, STATE TIMES/MORNING ADVOCATE , May 27, 2000, at 7-B (stating that
"there are people such as U.S. Rep. Bill McCollum, a Florida Republican, who say
a tiny percentage of those who are executed might be innocent, but that is a price
worth paying for an effective death penalty").
31 Mintz, supra note 25.
32 Id.
33 Yoffie, supra note 27.
34 S. 486, 107 Cong. (1"' Sess. 2001); H.R. 912, 107 Cong. (1"t Sess. 2001).
Note that as S. 486 and H.R. 912 will be referred to collectively as "The Act".
35 Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt ). See
also James Leibman, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, at
http://www.law.columbia.edu/instructionservices/liebman/ (last visited Nov. 4,
2000) (finding that the courts found reversible error in 68% of all capital cases
tried in the United States. When these individuals were retried, 82% were found
not to deserve the death penalty and 7% were found innocent of the capital crime
altogether. "Our 23 years worth of results reveal a death penalty system collapsing
under the weight of its mistakes. They reveal a system in which lives and public
order are at stake, yet for decades has made more mistakes then we would tolerate
in far less important activities. They reveal a system that is wasteful and broken
and needs to be addressed.").
36 S. 486, tit. I, § 101; H.R. 912, tit. I, § 101.
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a new trial based on newly discovered evidence of innocence must
be filed within three years or less of conviction.
37
The strict evidentiary laws imposed by the states are correlated
to the growing pressure on the judicial system to reduce frivolous
appeals and speed up executions. 38 Over the past decade, the Su-
preme Court, Congress, and several states have moved to expedite
executions by making appeals more difficult if not impossible.
39
For example, before Virginia abolished its time limit during which a
prisoner may introduce post-conviction DNA evidence, a prisoner
wishing to present such evidence had do so within 21 days of his or
her conviction. 40 After this date, the prisoner was forever barred
from appeals based on new evidence, no matter how exculpatory
the evidence was. 41 After the 21-day period, a judge lost jurisdic-
tion over a case even if he or she "[felt] there [had] been a gross
miscarriage of justice.
'42
In addition to reducing the number of appeals and obtaining
finality in criminal cases, another purpose of post-conviction evi-
dentiary laws is to prevent the use of evidence that has become less
reliable over time.43 However, the result of restricting all newly
found evidence precludes the use of DNA evidence, which remains
highly reliable for decades after a trial.44
The drafters of the Act found that DNA testing has emerged as
the "most reliable forensic technique for identifying criminals when
37 S. 486, tit. I, § 101(a)(8); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 101(a)(8).
38 See generally, Berlow, supra note 6. The importance of bring finality to
appeals is understood. However, while deadlines are incorporated in order to
keep the judicial system manageable and to prevent prisoners from appealing in-
definitely, they can also hinder prisoners who make legitimate albeit untimely ap-
peals. See Steve Mills, Questions of Innocence: Legal Roadblocks Thwart New
Evidence on Appeal, CHIc. TRIB., Dec. 18, 2000, at 1. These circumstances make it
even more difficult for prisoner's trying to prove they were wrongly convicted. Id.
39 See Berlow, supra note 6.
40 Id. See also Francis X. Clines, Pardoned Inmate's Lawyers Attack Virginia
Evidence Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A22. The change in Virginia's statute
of limitations regarding post-conviction DNA testing is further discussed in Part IV
of this Note.
41 Clines, supra note 40.
42 Id.
43 S. 486, tit. I § 101(a)(8), 107 Cong. 1" Sess. (2001); H.R. 912, tit. I,
§ 101(a)(8), 107 Cong. (1St Sess. 2001).
44 Id. See also S. 486 § 101(a)(4); H.R. 912 § 101 (a)(4) (stating "[u]niquely,
DNA evidence showing innocence, produced decades after a conviction, provides
a more reliable basis for establishing a correct verdict than any evidence proffered
at the original trial.").
108
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biological material is left at a crime scene. '45 While DNA testing is
commonplace in criminal investigations and trials today, it was not
available to most cases tried before 1994.46 Furthermore, new tech-
nology now allows for conclusive testing from minute samples,
which could not have previously been tested.47 As a result, some
convicted men and women have been exonerated by new DNA
tests after earlier testing had proven inconclusive. 48
The significance of the preclusion of such DNA evidence is
that while DNA testing could, in many cases, conclusively establish
guilt or innocence, it is out of the reach for many convicted people
49
notably those who were convicted before DNA testing technology
was available. 50 As a result, most prisoners with evidence of their
innocence can only hope for an executive clemency or pardon.51
Prior to 1996, state prisoners had an additional hope for justice
- an appeal to the federal courts.52 However, Congress under the
1996 Anti Terrorism and Death Penalty Reform Act extinguished
this hope. 53 "In its zeal to achieve finality in death penalty litiga-
tion, Congress eviscerated the great writ of federal habeas corpus,
the mechanism used for almost two hundred years by state prison-
ers who wanted a federal court to review the justice of their state
45 S. 486, § 101(a)(1); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(1).
46 S. 486, § 101(a)(3); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(3).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 S. 486 § 101(a)(8); H.R. 912 § 101(a)(8).
50 See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson). See also S.
486 § 101(a)(8) and H.R. 912 § 101(a)(8) (stating that "[b]ecause DNA testing was
not readily utilized in many jurisdictions until 1994-1995, there are many people
who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in the 1970's and 1980's who are still in
prison. Some of these wrongly convicted prisoners could be exonerated by DNA
testing if a procedural mechanism were available to assist both in facilitating a test
and in providing the necessary relief if the test revealed that the imprisoned appli-
cant was not guilty. While dozens of imprisoned people have already won their
release after DNA testing established their innocence, many others have been
blocked from DNA testing because postconviction remedies are no longer availa-
ble to them").
51 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218. Requests for clemency, however,
often do not lead to justice. One study showed that many persons believed to be
innocent (by the authors of the study) were refused clemency. See Bedau &
Radelet, supra note 30, at 91, and RADELET, ET. AL., supra note 30, at 5-10. See
also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 431 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
52 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218.
53 See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See also DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218-219.
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decisions. ' 54 Under the 1996 law, condemned prisoners only have
six months after their state appeals to request federal intervention,
and one year for other matters.55
The purposes of Title I of the Act are to reduce the risk of
wrongful convictions and executions by ensuring the availability of
DNA testing in appropriate cases,56 to "prevent the imposition of
unconstitutional punishments through the exercise of power
granted by Clause 1 of Section 8 and Clause 2 of Section 9 of Arti-
cle I of the Constitution of the United States and Section 5 of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States", 57 and to
ensure that persons who are wrongfully convicted have an opportu-
nity to prove their innocence through DNA testing by requiring the
preservation of DNA evidence for a limited period.58
54 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 218-219. See also BARRON'S LAW
DICTIONARY 214 (3rd ed. 1996) (explaining that "[t]he writ of federal habeas
corpus is used to test the unconstitutionality of a state criminal conviction. It
pierces through the formalities of a state conviction to determine whether the con-
viction is consonant with due process of law"). See also Berlow, supra note 6 (stat-
ing that "[t]he radical revision of habeas law was sold to the House of
Representatives by Henry Hyde, the chairman of the Judiciary Committee, as the
'Holy Grail" of criminal justice reform, a long-sought change that would address
what he called 'the absurdity, the obscenity' of 'endless appeals' in death-penalty
cases"). Interestingly, at the time of the 1996's enactment, only 1% of all habeas
petitions were from death row prisoners. Id. A full analysis of habeas corpus is
beyond the scope of this Note. For further information, see generally JAMES S.
LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE (3d ed. 1998); DONALD E. WILKES, JR., FEDERAL POST CONVICTION REME-
DIES AND RELIEF (1996).
55 See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 219. A prisoner's hope for federal
relief has been restricted further by the Supreme Court's decision in Herrerra, 506
U.S. 390, which is discussed in Part IV.
56 S. 486 § 101(b)(1); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(1).
57 S. 486 § 101(b)(2); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(2). See also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8,
cl. 1, (explaining "[t]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the Common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform throughout the United States"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3, (stating
"[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it"); U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5, (explaining "[tjhe Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-
propriate legislation, the provisions of this article").
58 S. 486 § 101(b)(3); H.R. 912 § 101(b)(3).
2001] INNOCENCE PROTECTION ACT 111
PART III: EFFECT OF THE ACT ON CURRENT FEDERAL LAW
To ensure the availability of post-conviction DNA testing, the
Act would amend Part VI of Title 28 of the United States Code by
inserting Chapter 156-DNA Testing.59 Within Chapter 156 is pro-
posed Section 2291, DNA Testing.60 Section 2291 would allow a
person convicted of a Federal crime to apply to the appropriate
Federal court for DNA testing to support the person's claim that he
or she did not commit the Federal crime for which he or she was
convicted 6' or any other offense that a sentencing authority relied
upon when it imposed a sentence of death or an enhanced term of
imprisonment for a career offender or armed career offender.
62
Once an application for DNA testing is made to the court, the
court must notify the government, who has an opportunity to re-
spond.63 When notice of a convicted person's request is received,
the government shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all
evidence secured in connection with the case that could be subject
to DNA testing is preserved pending the completion of the pro-
ceedings.64 If any evidence is destroyed after an order is issued, the
court may impose sanctions such as criminal contempt.
65
The court shall order DNA testing pursuant to a prisoner's ap-
plication if it determines that the evidence still exists and in such
condition that testing is possible;66 the evidence was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing currently requested and that
may resolve an issue which was not resolved by earlier testing;67 the
DNA testing proposed utilizes a valid, scientific technique; 68 and if
the DNA testing proposed can provide new and noncumulative evi-
dence relevant to the prisoner's claim that he or she did not commit
the Federal crime for which he or she was convicted 69 or any other
offense that a sentencing authority relied upon when it imposed a
59 S. 486 § 102(a); H.R. 912 § 102(a).
60 Id.
61 S. 486 § 102(a) § 2291 (a)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(a)(1).
62 S. 486 § 102(a), §2291 (a)(2); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(a)(2).
63 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (b); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(b).
64 S. 486 tit. I, §102(a), chpt. 156, §2291 (c); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 102(a), chpt.
156, § 2291(c).
65 Id.
66 S. 486 § 102(a),§ 2291 (d)(1)(A); H.R. 912, tit. I, § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(A).
67 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(B); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(B).
68 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(C); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(C).
69 S. 486 § 102(a), §2291 (d)(1)(D)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(d)(1)(D)(i).
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sentence of death or an enhanced term of imprisonment for a ca-
reer offender or armed career offender. 70 The court shall not issue
an order for DNA testing if the government proves by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the application was raised in order to de-
lay an execution or administration of justice rather than to support
a claim of innocence. 71
The court may order, in the interests of justice, that the cost
incurred by the DNA testing be paid by either the government or
the prisoner.72 No prisoner will be denied DNA testing due to his
or her inability to pay for it.7
3
If the result of the DNA testing is inconclusive, the court may
either order further testing74 or dismiss the applicant's applica-
tion.75 If the DNA testing is not in the applicant's favor, the court
shall dismiss the application;76 assess the applicant for the testing
costs; 77 and make any further orders as it deems appropriate. 7
8 If
the result of the DNA testing is in the applicant's favor, the court
shall order a hearing and thereafter make additional orders appro-
priate under applicable post-conviction proceedings. 79
To ensure that biological evidence would be available for post-
conviction DNA testing, the Act would amend Part IV of Title 28 of
the United States Code by inserting within proposed Chapter 156,
Section 2292, Preservation of Biological Material. 80 Section 2292
would require the government to "preserve all evidence that was
secured in relation to the investigation or prosecution of a Federal
crime ... and that could be subjected to DNA testing, for not less
than the period of time that any person remains subject to incarcer-
ation in connection with the investigation or prosecution." 81 The
government may only destroy such evidence before the expiration
of the proscribed time if there is no statute, regulation, court order
70 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(D)(ii); H.R. 912 § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(D)(ii).
71 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (d)(1)(D)(ii)(2); H.R. 912 § 102(a),
§ 2291(d)(1)(D)(ii)(2).
72 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (e); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(e).
73 Id.
74 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (g)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(1).
75 Id.
76 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2291 (g)(2)(A); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(2)(A).
77 S. 486 § 102(a),§ 2291 (g)(2)(B); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(2)(B).
78 S. 486 § 102 a , § 2291 (g)(2)(C); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2291(g)(2)(C).
79 S. 486 §102(a), § 2291(g)(3); H.R. 912 § 102(a), 
§ 2291(g)(3).
80 S. 486 § 102 a , §2292; H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292.
81 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(a); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(a).
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or any other provision of law that requires the preservation of the
evidence;8 2 the government notifies the incarcerated person and his
or her attorney of its intention to destroy the evidence 8 3 and of the
prisoner's right to DNA testing under the provisions of Chapter 156
to make an application for DNA testing within 180 days;84 the evi-
dence must be returned to its rightful owner or is unable to be re-
tained by the government in a practical manner;85 and the
government takes reasonable measures to remove and preserve
portions of the material to allow future DNA testing.8 6
PART IV: EFFECTS OF THE ACT ON STATE LAW
Section 103 of the Act proposes to require that if a state re-
quests funds from the DNA analysis backlog elimination grants,8 7
Paul Coverdell national forensic sciences improvement grants,88
DNA identification grants,8 9 drug control system improvement
grants,90 and public safety and community policing grants 91 to de-
velop or improve DNA laboratories or testing, the state must first
certify that it will make post-conviction DNA testing available to
prisoner's convicted of a state crime in a consistent manner as set
forth in §2291 of Title 28 of the United States Code;92 and that it
will preserve all evidence obtained in connection with the investiga-
tion or prosecution of the prisoner that could be subjected to DNA
testing for no less than the time period set forth under §2292 of
Title 28 of the United States Code.93
Under Section 104 of the Act (Prohibition Pursuant to Section
5 of the 14 h Amendment), a state may not deny a request for DNA
testing made by a person in state custody who has been sentenced
82 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(1); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(1).
83 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(A)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(A)(1).
84 Id.
85 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(i); H.R. 912 § 102(a) , § 2292(b)(2)(B)(i).
86 S. 486 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(ii); H.R. 912 § 102(a), § 2292(b)(2)(B)(ii).
87 See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546,
§2.
88 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
106-561, tit. 1, § BB.
89 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 tit I § X (codi-
fied as 42 U.S.C. 3796 §kk et seq. (2000)).
90 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (codified as 42
U.S.C. 3796 § dd et seq. (2001)).
91 See Id.
92 S. 486 §103(a)(1); H.R. 912 § 103(a)(1).
93. S. 486 § 103(a)(2); H.R. 912 § 103(a)(2).
114 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
to death 94 if the proposed DNA testing has the ability to produce
new and noncumulative evidence material to the prisoner's claim of
innocence 95 regarding the crime for which he or she was sentenced
to death 96 or any other offense that was relied upon during his or
her sentencing.
97
The Act also provides that no state shall enforce a time limit or
procedural default rule to deny a state prisoner under a death sen-
tence the ability to present in state court any new, noncumulative
evidence obtained through DNA testing that establish a "reasona-
ble probability" the he or she did not commit the crime. 98
Opponents of post-conviction DNA testing argue that the re-
quirements set forth in the Act would impose significant burdens on
the states, namely substantial costs and flooded courtrooms. 99
However, states that have enacted legislation similar to the Act
have found these concerns to be unfounded. While providing DNA
testing for indigent prisoners would result in costs to the state, the
relatively modest costs will decline as pre-trial testing becomes
more routine. 100 Additionally, as DNA testing would be provided
only to prisoners who meet certain standards - for example, the
evidence was not tested during trial and that such testing would
likely provide probative results - the number of frivolous requests
would be limited.10 1
94 S. 486 § 104(a); H.R. 912 § 104(a).
95 Id.
96 S. 486 § 104(a)(2); H.R. 912 § 104(a)(2).
97 S. 486 § 104(a)(3); H.R. 912 § 104(a)(3).
98 S. 486 § 104(b); H.R. 912 § 104(b).
99 See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Hon. William D. Delahunt).
100 Id. See also Barry Scheck; Director Innocence Project, Cardozo School of
Law, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Aug. 13, 2000, at G-5 (stating that the Justice
Department claims that for a typical case, it costs between $2,000 - $5,000 to com-
plete DNA testing). See also Alpert, supra note 15 (quoting Scheck as stating that
"[DNA testing] is a lot cheaper than keeping an innocent person in prison. Costs
for many state prisons average anywhere from $20,000 to $25,000 a year per
inmate").
101 For example, since enacting legislation allowing post-conviction DNA test-
ing four years ago, Illinois has conducted fewer that 100 tests. See Jennifer War-
ren, Bill Gives Inmates Right to DNA Tests Ok'd; Justice: Legislators Send Measure
to Davis on Unanimous Vote; Aim is to Prevent False Imprisonment, L.A. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 2000, at Al.
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PART V: CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY FOR
FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Article I of the 14th Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.' 10 2 The 8th Amendment fur-
ther protects citizens of the United States from "cruel and unusual
punishments. 10 3 Considering these two provisions, a state's refusal
to review newly found, exculpatory post-conviction evidence be-
cause of post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions would violate
a prisoner's constitutional rights, especially in capital cases.10 4
However, in Herrera v. Collins, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that Texas's refusal to review an inmate's newly
discovered evidence10 5 did .not "transgress a principle of fundamen-
tal fairness 'rooted in the traditions and conscience of the people',
so as to violate the Fourteenth Amendment."10 6 Chief Justice Wil-
102 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, art. 1.
103 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
104 See generally Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). See also id. at 431 (stating that "[w]e are being asked to decide whether
the Constitution forbids the execution of a person who has been validly convicted
and sentenced but who, nonetheless, can prove his innocence with newly discov-
ered evidence. Despite the State of Texas' astonishing protestation to the contrary
... I do not see how the answer can be anything but 'yes"').
105 Before Texas amended its law, in order for a prisoner to obtain a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence, he or she must have filed a motion within 30
days after sentencing. See TEX. RULE App. PROC. § 31(a)(1) (1992). The amended
Texas law, which excludes post-conviction DNA testing from the 30-day time pe-
riod, is further discussed in Part IV of this Note.
106 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 407, (quoting the standard set in Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)). Leonel Torres Herrera was convicted of the capital
murder of a police officer and was sentenced to death. He later pled guilty to the
murder of another police officer. After conviction, in a plea for direct review,
Herrera argued that identifications made by one of the police officer's partner had
been improperly admitted. The conviction was upheld. Herrera then unsuccess-
fully petitioned for state and federal habeas corpus relief. Following the federal
habeas denial, Herrera filed a second petition for state habeas corpus relief. In
this petition, Herrera claimed that his deceased brother had confessed to murder-
ing the police officer. This claim was backed up by affidavits of two other people
- including the brother's son who claimed to have witnessed the murder. After
this petition was rejected - and ten years after his conviction - Herrera filed
another federal habeas corpus petition claiming his "actual innocence" of the po-
lice officer's murder. Herrera contented that his execution would violate the Fed-
eral Constitution under (1) the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
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liam Rehnquist, writing for the majority, further held that "a claim
of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim, ' 10 7 and that
"claims of innocence based on newly discovered evidence have
never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent
an independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying
state criminal proceeding." 10 8 A majority of the Court did concede,
however, that it would be unconstitutional for a state to impose a
punishment when there was "a truly persuasive demonstration of
actual innocence" made after a trial.
10 9
Reflecting on the Court's decision in Herrera, it is clear that
federal legislation is necessary and proper to ensure that federal
and state governments will take the appropriate steps in allowing
post-conviction DNA testing and preservation of biological evi-
dence. °10 Unless a state revokes its statute of limitations for post-
punishment clause and (2) the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. The
district court granted Herrera a stay of execution so that his claim of actual inno-
cence and the two affidavits offered in the state petition could be reviewed in
court. On appeal, the appellate court vacated the stay and expressed the view that
newly discovered evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner was not a
ground for federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court affirmed on certiorari. Her-
rera was executed in 1993. See America's Death-Penalty Lottery, THE ECONOMIST,
June 10, 2000.
107 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
108 Id. at 401. The Court refers to Chief Justice Warren's decision in Town-
send v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, stating that "[w]here newly discovered evidence is al-
leged in a habeas application, evidence which could not reasonably have been
presented to the state trier of facts, the federal court must grant an evidentiary
hearing. Of course, such evidence must bear upon the constitutionality of the ap-
plicant's detention; the existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to
the guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus." 372
U.S. 293 at 317. (Emphasis added).
109 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404. Note that the Court is stating that it is the pun-
ishment that would be unconstitutional, not the lack of ability to prove one's inno-
cence. For a further analysis of Herrera v. Collins and its effect on actual
innocence claims, see generally, Michael J. Muskat, Substantive Justice and State
Interest in the Aftermath of Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the
Resolution of Bare Innocence Claims Through State Postconviction Remedies, 75
TEX. L. REV. 131 (1996).
110 S. 486 § 101(a)(16) and H.R. 912 § 101(a)(16). In Title I, Section 101 of
the Act, the drafters found that "[g]iven the irremediable constitutional harm that
would result from the execution of an innocent person and the failure of many
States to ensure that innocent persons are not sentenced to death, a Federal statute
assuring the availability of DNA testing and a chance to present the results of
testing in court is a congruent and proportional prophylactic measure to prevent
constitutional injuries from occurring."
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conviction DNA evidence, many prisoners claiming their innocence
with DNA evidence will be caught between state law and the ratio-
nale proclaimed in Herrera, and therefore left without further re-
course. If fact, many prisoners may find themselves in an
impossible scenario. He or she may know that a DNA test would
prove their innocence, but they are not able to get a hold of the
evidence to be tested - either because state officials refuse to re-
lease the evidence or because the evidence has been destroyed.
Even if the evidence was obtained and a DNA test result is found to
be in the prisoner's favor, the state may still refuse to consider it
because of post-conviction evidentiary time restrictions. 1 '
Unless a prisoner can get past the state's restrictions, they have
no hope of constitutional relief from the Supreme Court, because as
the Court stated in Herrera, a "claim of innocence is not a constitu-
tional right." 112 Because the Court will not interfere with a state
law denying the review of evidence found past the statutory time
period,113 the only way the Supreme Court is willing to help a pris-
oner with a claim of innocence is if the prisoner already has the
newly found evidence and it is so clearly exculpatory that a state's
keeping of the inmate in prison would be a clear violation of the
Constitution.
11 4
The result is that the prisoner is trapped between a state law
that won't allow the testing of DNA evidence and the Supreme
M1l See DWYER ET AL., supra note 9, at 63-73 (discussing the case of Walter
Snyder, a man in Virginia wrongly accused of rape. After spending seven years in
prison, a DNA test proved his innocence. However, because of Virginia's 21-day
evidentiary rule - which, at the time, did not have an exception for DNA evi-
dence - Snyder's only recourse was executive clemency).
112 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404.
113 For example, see id. at 392 (stating "[b]ecause state legislative judgments
are entitled to substantial deference in the criminal procedure area, criminal pro-
cess will be found lacking only where it offends some principle of justice so rooted
in tradition and conscience as to be ranked as fundamental. It cannot be said that
the refusal of Texas - which requires a new trial motion based on newly discov-
ered evidence to be made within 30 days of imposition or suspension of sentence
- to entertain Herrera's new evidence eight years after his conviction transgresses
a principle of fundamental fairness, in light of the Constitution's silence on the
subject of new trials, the historical availability of new on newly discovered evi-
dence, this Court's amendments to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 to im-
pose a time limit for filing new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence,
and the contemporary practice in the States, only nine of which have no time limits
for the filing of such motions").
114 Id. at 401.
117
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Court decision in Herrera stating that the Court will not review the
case because he or she does not have an exculpatory "colorful
showing of actual innocence." 115 In this case, it is the DNA test
itself that could provide the evidence of innocence, and without it,
the prisoner has no chance of federal habeas relief.'
16
A prime example of the problems a prisoner with a claim of
innocence faces can be seen in the case of Kenneth Charron, a Mis-
souri man who has spent almost 14 years in prison for a conviction
of rape and robbery.117 Charron claims that his innocence could be
proven by submitting evidence to DNA testing, a technology that
was not available to him at the time of his trial.118 The problem
Charron faces, however, is that the evidence is in the custody of the
Circuit Attorney, who refuses to turn the evidence over for test-
ing. 119 Because Missouri law requires that new evidence be submit-
ted within 15 days of conviction, 20 Charron attempted to appeal to
the federal courts.121
Since Charron failed to raise the issue of DNA testing in a
state court and because of the time limits set by the Federal Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which helps
states shorten the appeals process and allows them to limit a pris-
oner's habeas corpus appeals, the federal courts refused to hear his
appeal.' 22
The Supreme Court claims that when a state prisoner finds
himself or herself with evidence of his or her innocence but is none-
theless precluded by procedural bars from proving it, he or she is
115 Id. at 404.
116 Id.
117 Bill Bryan, Inmate Claims DNA Test Would Set Him Free; But Appeals
Law Blocks His Efforts to Prove It, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 1999 at B 1.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Science and the Hangman, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 4, 2000, at B2.
121 Bryan, supra note 117.
122 Id. The irony of the Missouri law allowing the Circuit Attorney to with-
hold the evidence is exacerbated by the fact that Missouri has a state program that
collects blood samples from certain convicts and places the samples into a DNA
database. The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) compares inmate's DNA
with DNA found at unsolved crime scenes. Charron has asked that his blood be
taken, but was refused by state officials who stated "if he wants his DNA tested, he
has to pay for that himself and arrange for that himself." However, the officials did
not elaborate how this was to be done with the evidence in the hands of state
officials. Id.
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not completely left without recourse. 123 As a last resort, a prisoner
may request an executive clemency or pardon. 12 4 For a prisoner
with a claim of innocence based on DNA evidence, he or she would
first have to request the governor or pardon board to grant ap-
proval for the DNA test, and if the results were in the prisoner's
favor, then he or she must request either a full pardon or new
trial.1
25
The idea of putting a claim of innocence - especially a claim
that could be so conclusively proven with DNA - into the hands of
political appointees defiles the entire purpose of the Constitu-
tion.12 6 As defined by the U.S. Supreme Court, a pardon is an "act
123 Herrera, 506 U.S at 411.
124 Id. It should be noted that while the Constitution grants the President a
pardon power (Art. I, §2, cl. 1), it does not require the States to enact their own
clemency systems. Id. at 414. See also id., (stating "[e]xecutive clemency has pro-
vided the 'fail safe' in our criminal justice system"). An in-depth analysis of the
constitutionality, sufficiency and fairness of clemency as the only resort for claims
of innocence is beyond the scope of this Note. For further analysis of this issue, see
generally, Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on
Commutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311
(1996) and Vivian Berger, Herrera v. Collins: The Gateway to Innocence for
Death-Sentenced Prisoners Leads Nowhere, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943 (1994).
125 DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 218-219. For a further description of
state commutation practices, see Palacios, supra note 124, at 344-347.
126 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also id., (stating
that "[w]hatever procedures a State might adopt to hear actual-innocence claims,
one thing is certain: The possibility of executive clemency is not sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The vindication of
rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never been made to turn on the unre-
viewable discretion of an executive official or administrative tribunal"). See also
Palacios, supra note 124, at 350 (stating that governors are often unwilling to grant
clemency for fear of political repercussions). By 1994, it was clear that Justice
Blackmun had had enough of the death penalty. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S.
1141 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "[f]rom this day forward, I no
longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For more than twenty years, I
have endeavored - indeed, I have struggled - with a majority of this Court, to
develop procedural and substantive rules that would lend more than the mere ap-
pearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to coddle
the Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been achieved and the
need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and intellectually obligated simply
to concede that the death penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self evident
to me now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive regulations ever
can save the death penalty from its inherent constitutional deficiencies. The basic
question - does the system accurately and consistently determine which defen-
dant's "deserve" to die? - cannot be answered in the affirmative. It is not simply
that this Court has allowed vague aggravating circumstances to be employed ...
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of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.'
' 27
As the dissent in Herrera stated, we no longer live under a govern-
ment of laws once the exercise of legal rights turns on acts of
grace. 128 "The very purpose of the Bill of Rights was to withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to es-
tablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
' 129
One must also question whether a governor or a pardon board
is able to make as equal and fair of a determination of one's guilt or
innocence as a judge or jury. 130 One area of concern is whether a
governor has the necessary time available to make a decision as
and vital judicial review to be blocked. The problem is that the inevitability of
factual, legal and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill
some defendants, a system that fails to deliver fair, consistent, and reliable
sentences of death required by the Constitution.").
127 Herrera, 506 U.S. at 413, quoting Chief Justice Marshall's holding in
United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161 (1833).
128 Id. at 441. See also, id. (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
"The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a govern-
ment of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appella-
tion, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested right."
129 Herrera at 441, (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
130 See Erika Casriel, Bush & The Texas Death Machine, ROLLING STONE,
Aug. 3, 2000, at 34 (stating that "[t]estimony revealed that the [Texas Board of
Pardons and Parole] board members handle more than 5,000 parole and pardon
requests a year, since the number of prison inmates grew from 70,000 in 1994 to
150,000 in 1999, with no concurrent increase in parole board staff"). See also Ste-
phen E. Silverman, Note, There is Nothing Certain Like Death in Texas: State Ex-
ecutive Clemency Boards Turn a Deaf Ear to Death Row Inmates' Last Appeals, 37
ARiz. L. REv. 375, 389-98 (1995) (claiming that the Texas pardon boards may not
have the experience or impartiality to render justice); The Innocence Protection
Act of 2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before the House Judiciary Committee on
Crime, 106th Cong. 2
"d Sess. (2000) (statement of Congressman Robert C. Scott,
Virginia) (stating that "[t]he notion that the flaws in the system can be addressed
through a governor's clemency process is clearly an inadequate response to a seri-
ous problem. Our criminal justice principles are designed to ensure a fair trial for
all accused persons. Ultimate questions of life, death or freedom should not de-
pend upon the politics of the moment or the popularity of the defendant or
whether the governor is in an election campaign, or any such vagary. Further-
more, the governor's office is an inappropriate forum to decide such cases. The
governor has no subpoena power, no right or opportunity to cross examine key
witnesses or to observe witnesses subject to cross examination by advocates famil-
iar with the case. Nor does the governor have other investigatory power necessary
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important as whether someone should be executed or not.131 For
example, from the time he took office in 1995 through August 2000,
George W. Bush, as the former governor of Texas, approved 135
executions, 132 approximately one death penalty case every two
weeks. 133 By his account, he found time to review every case while
he was governing Texas and campaigning for the presidency.1 34
In making his decision on whether to grant clemency for a pris-
oner, former Governor Bush had the help of the eighteen-member
Texas Board of Pardons and Parole. 35 Made up of the Governor's
appointees, the Board votes on all clemency applications and sends
its decisions to the Governor. 36 In a 1998 lawsuit against the
Board, 37 testimony revealed that the board members heard over
5,000 pardon and parole requests a year. 138 While the number of
prison inmates more than doubled in the last six years, no similar
increase has been made to the board's staff.'
39
If the Act is passed, a prisoner with exculpatory evidence of his
or her innocence will no longer be trapped between restrictive state
evidentiary laws and the lack of federal recourse. 40 Instead, the
changes made to state post-conviction evidentiary laws would en-
sure that a prisoner has the right to test evidence in the hands of the
government, conditional only on the probability of its exculpatory
nature, and not on strict timing requirements.1 41 Also, the require-
to ensure fairness. The forum for testing the reliability of evidence is the trial, not
the political forum of the governor's office").
131 See Casriel, supra note 130, at 34.
132 Id. at 29.
133 Id.
134 See Mintz, supra note 25, In an interview with Tim Russert of NBC's
Meet the Press, Governor Bush was asked if he would "join with Governor Ryan
in invoking a moratorium on any execution of people on death row until the sys-
tem can be analyzed and through with all the introduction of DNA evidence so
you don't make a mistake?" The Governor's responded "No, I won't. Because
I'm confident that every person that has been put to death in Texas, under my
watch, has been guilty of the crime charged and has [had] full access to the courts
... I've reviewed every case that has come across my desk - I'm confident of the
guilt of the person who committed the crime." Id.
135 See Casriel, supra note 130, at 34.
136 Id.
137 The suit claimed that as Texas is the only state which does not hold public




140 S. 486 § 101 and H.R. 912 § 101.
141 See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson).
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ment under the Act which would preserve all biological evidence
for the length of a prisoner's sentence 142 would ensure that a pris-
oner would be able to prove his or her claim of innocence through
DNA testing without the concern that the state could destroy the
evidence at any time.
143
The Act would also move the determination of guilt or inno-
cence back into the proper hands of the judicial system. 44 The pro-
visions of the Act would give a prisoner the right to prove his or her
innocence in court 45 rather then plead their case to governors, who
are often preoccupied with official state business, or clemency
boards with case loads beyond their means.146
PART VI: SIMILAR STATE LEGISLATION
If passed, the Act would require the states to adopt legislation
equal to the changes made to the federal law.' 47 Many states, real-
izing the important role DNA testing plays in the pursuit of justice,
have passed statutes to guide the courts on DNA requests made by
inmates. 48 For example, arguments in favor of giving inmates
more access to DNA testing were successful in Arizona, Oklahoma
and Tennessee, but only for those prisoners receiving a sentence of
death or life imprisonment. 149 Similar legislation was passed in
Washington, but only applies to those sentenced to death. 150
At the end of 2000, only three states - New York, Illinois and
California - had laws giving inmates the right to post-conviction
DNA testing equal in breadth to what the Act would provide.
151
During the first half of 2001, several states have adopted similar
legislation.1 52 The most notable states to adopt the legislation are
142 S. 486 § 102, § 2292 and H.R. § 102, § 2292.
143 See Hearings, supra note 9 (statement of Bryan Stevenson).
144 See DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 219. See also generally Herrera v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430-446 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
145 See generally Herrera, 506 U.S. at 430-446 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
146 See Casriel, supra note 130.
147 See Rovella, supra note 14. See also notes 59-86 and accompanying text.
148 See Lazar, supra note 7.
149 See supra note 20.
150 Id.
151 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30 (1994), ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3
(1997), and CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405 (2001). See also Erin Hallissy, Charlie Good-
year, Davis Signs Bill to Allow DNA Testing for Inmates, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 29,
2000 at Al.
152 See generally Hansen, supra note 7.
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Texas and Virginia, who have fought long and hard to keep strict
statutes of limitations regarding post-conviction evidence.
PIONEERING STATES
A. New York
In 1994, the New York State Legislature amended New York
Criminal Procedure Law 440.30 to authorize post-conviction DNA
testing in certain circumstances. 153 The statute requires a court to
grant a prisoner's request for post-conviction DNA testing if the
court makes two determinations.1 54 First, the court must find that
"the specified evidence containing DNA was secured in connection
with the trial resulting in the judgment."'1 55 Second, if a DNA test
had been conducted on such evidence and the results had been ad-
mitted in the trial resulting in the judgment, the court must deter-
mine that "there exists a reasonable probability that the verdict
would have been more favorable to the defendant."'1 5
6
New York has found that "a statutory right to post-conviction
DNA testing, coupled with an appropriate standard, can produce
results both just and practical. '157 In fact, since the enactment of
the statute, more than seven people were exonerated by post-con-
viction DNA testing.
158
Not only has NYCPL 440.30 been found to be effective, it has
also proven to critics of post-conviction DNA testing legislation
that a statutory right to the testing will not cause an avalanche of
appeals and delays.159 By restricting post-conviction DNA testing
to cases where the results would be clearly exculpatory, New York
has managed to keep the number of appeals based on the testing to
a workable number. 16o As stated above, under the New York law,
requests for post-conviction DNA testing will only be granted if
153 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30. See also Hearings (statement of Eliot
Spitzer), supra note 18.
154 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30.
155 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30. The New York law, in fact, is the model
for the Act. See Christi Daugherty, Freedom in a Genetic Fingerprint: DNA Test-
ing Can Overturn Convictions, but There are Serious Iniquities in the Law, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, July 22, 2000 at 22.
156 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §440.30.
157 Id.
158 Id. See also DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9.
159 See Hearings (statement of Honorable William D. Delahunt), supra note
5.
160 See Hearings (statement of Eliot Spitzer), supra note 18.
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there is "reasonable probability" that the verdict would have been
more favorable to the defendant had the results been admitted at
trial.161 A court would reject a request for testing when it had de-
termined that "there was not a reasonable probability that the ver-
dict would have been more favorable to the defendant even with
the results of a DNA test. '162
New York's law enforcement community has also been sup-
portive of the value of DNA testing.163 Referencing post-convic-
tion DNA testing, former New York Police Commissioner Howard
Safir stated that he has "seen the immense value of DNA evidence
as both an inculpatory and exculpatory tool for law enforce-
ment,"'164 and that the "existence of a statutory requirement [for




Like New York, Illinois has a statute allowing inmates to re-
quest post-conviction DNA testing.1 66 So far, under its law, four-
teen Illinois prisoners have been exonerated.1 67 Enacted in 1997,
Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure §116-3 is drawn narrowly. 168
Similar to the New York law, prisoners must meet a certain criteria
for the law to apply.1 69 An inmate's conviction must have occurred
before DNA technology was used in criminal investigations -
meaning that the statute would only be useful for crimes committed
more than 10 years ago. 170 Furthermore, the conviction has to be
161 Id. As an example of the selectivity of the statute, Spitzer discussed Mat-
ter of Washpon, 164 Misc.2d 991 (Kings County 1995). In Washpon, a rape case,
the court ordered post-conviction DNA testing because the victim had testified
that she had not had sex with anyone but the rapist on the night of the crime. Id.
162 Id. As an example of the selectivity of the statute, Spitzer discussed Peo-
ple v. Kellar, 218 A.D.2d 406 (3d Dept 1996). In Kellar, a rape case, the court
rejected a request for post-conviction DNA testing where the defendant had con-
ceded that he had sex with the victim, but that it had been consensual. In this case,




166 See ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
167 See Mintz, supra note 25.
168 See A Test for Innocence, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, Dec. 27, 1999, at 6B.
169 Id.
170 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
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based solely on witness identification. 171 Finally, the evidence to be
tested must have been in the custody of law enforcement from the
time of trial.
172
Also similar to the New York law, the Illinois law will not allow
post-conviction DNA testing if there is "substantial corroborating
evidence of guilt."'1 73 For example, if a convict was identified as a
rapist by the victim and then confessed to the crime or claimed that
the sex was consensual, the convict would not be entitled to have
his case reopened under the DNA testing statute.
174
The Illinois law also contains safeguarding provisions to reduce
the number of frivolous requests filed by otherwise qualifying pris-
oners.175 For example, a prisoner found to have made an unjusti-




On September 28, 2000, Governor Gray Davis of California
signed legislation allowing post-conviction DNA testing.177 Like
the New York and Illinois statutes, California Penal Code §1405
allows convicted felons to seek DNA testing in order to establish a
claim of innocence and demonstrate that genetic evidence could
have affected the outcome of his or her trial. 178 Although passed
too recently to examine the effects of the new law, it is inevitable
that many cases will be overturned based on post-conviction DNA
evidence. 17
9
171 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3. For further discussion of the validity of
witness identification, see generally Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod &
Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense
Evaluations, 3 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 338 (1997) and DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9,
at 41-77.
172 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 David Heckelman, Edgar OK's Measure for DNA, Other Tests, CHICAGO
DAILY BULLETIN, Jul. 23, 1997, at 1.
176 ILL. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 116-3.
177 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405 (2001). See also Hallissy et. al., supra note
151.
178 See Howard Mintz, New Law Could Affect Hundreds of Inmates, THE SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 29, 2000.
179 Id. (stating "[b]ecause DNA technology generally was not introduced into
the state's criminal justice system until about 1993, there are possibly hundreds of
125
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Under the California law, a prisoner serving a term of impris-
onment may make a motion requesting DNA testing before the
trial court that entered his or her conviction.180 The motion, veri-
fied under oath by the prisoner, must explain why the identity of
the perpetrator should have been a significant issue in his or her
trial.181 Additionally, the prisoner's motion must explain how the
requested DNA testing would raise a "reasonable probability" that
he or she would have had more favorable results at trial.182 Finally,
the prisoner must make a reasonable attempt to identify the evi-
dence to be tested and the type of DNA testing sought.
183
Based upon the success of the post evidentiary laws passed in
New York and Illinois - and the potential success of the California
law - it is clear that the provisions of the Act would help other
states in reducing the risk of imprisoning or executing an innocent
man or woman. 184 Since New York and Illinois enacted laws al-
lowing post conviction DNA testing, 21 wrongfully convicted pris-
oners have been released from their prisons. 185 If the rest of the
states adopt the provisions of the Act, it is evident that this number
would dramatically rise.
WELCOMED ADDITIONS
Several states have been adamant in keeping a short and strict
statute of limitations regarding post-conviction evidence, making
post-conviction DNA testing nearly impossible. 86 As a result, sev-
eral prisoners claiming their innocence have come close to being
executed while ultimately exonerated because of DNA evidence1
87
Recently, two states with the strictest post-conviction evidentiary
defendants in California prisons who now will have a specific mechanism for put-
ting their claims of innocence to the scientific test").
180 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405(a) (2001).
181 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405 (a)(1).
182 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405(a)(2).
183 See CAL. PEN. CODE §1405(a)(3).
184 See generally Hearings (statement of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attor-
ney General), supra note 18. See also generally The Innocence Protection Act of
2000: Hearings on H.R. 4167 Before the House Judiciary Committee on Crime, 10 6th
Cong. (2"d Sess. 2000) (statement of George H. Ryan, Governor of Illinois).
185 See Hearings (statement of Eliot Spitzer) supra note 18. See also Mintz,
supra note 25.
186 See Science and the Hangman, supra note 120.
187 See id.
1L26
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laws have passed laws similar to the provisions of the Act - Texas
and Virginia.
A. Texas
Nowhere was the need for legislation similar to the Act greater
than in Texas, which leads all other states in executions. 188 On
April 5, 2001, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed legislation that
removes post-conviction DNA testing from the state's 30-day post-
conviction evidentiary statute of limitations.1 89 Under the new legis-
lation, Texas must insure the preservation of biological evidence
that was in the possession of the state during the prosecution of the
case' 90 that might establish the identity of the person who commit-
ted the offence or any element of the offense for which the prisoner
was convicted. 91 In capital cases, the evidence must be preserved
until the inmate is executed, dies, or released on parole. 92 In non-
capital cases, the evidence must be preserved until the prisoner
dies, completes his or her sentence, or is released. 93
If a convicted prisoner wants to access evidence for DNA test-
ing, under the new Texas law, the prisoner may submit a motion to
the court if the evidence was secured in relation to the conviction
being challenged194 and is in the possession of the state during the
trial.' 95 Additionally, the evidence must not have been previously
subjected to DNA testing because DNA testing was not available
196
or, if the evidence was previously tested, it may be re-tested subject
to new techniques that provide a "reasonable likelihood" of more
accurate results.
197
Before the adoption of the new legislation, Texas law required
that in order to obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evi-
dence, a prisoner had to file a motion within 30 days of his or her
188 As of August 31, 2001, 731 men and women have been executed in the
United States since the reinstatement of the death penalty in 1976. Death Penalty
Information Center, supra note 2. As of June 1, 2001, Texas had executed 246
people - more that a third of the national total. Jim Yardley, Texas Set to Shift in
Wake of Furor on Death Penalty, N. Y. TIMES, June 1, 2001, at Al.
189 TEX. RULE CRIM . P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (2001).
190 TEX. RULE GRIM .P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (B)(1) (2001).
191 TEX. RULE CRIM P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (B)(2) (2001).
192 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (C)(1) (2001).
193 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. ch. 38, art. 38.39 (C)(2) (2001).
194 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01 (B) (2001).
195 Id.
196 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01 (Bll (2001).
197 TEX. RULE CRIM .P. tit. 1, ch. 64, art. 64.01 (B 2 2001).
128 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XVIII
sentencing. 198 Because of this strict evidentiary rule, prisoners
found it nearly impossible to obtain post-conviction DNA testing
and could only hope for clemency or a pardon.199
An example of the power of post-conviction DNA testing can
be seen in the case of A.B. Butler, Jr. who was pardoned by former
Texas Governor George W. Bush in May of 2000 after spending 17
years in prison for a crime he did not commit.2 00 Serving a 99-year
sentence for rape and kidnapping, Butler learned in 1990 of the
FBI's use of DNA testing.201 He then unsuccessfully attempted to
obtain a DNA test for seven years but was continually barred by
Texas' post-evidentiary laws. 20 2 Only after obtaining the help of
Centurion Ministries, a New Jersey based group that helps free the
wrongfully convicted, 20 3 did Texas officials consent to the testing.
204
While Butler was ultimately exonerated, the amount of time he
spent in jail would have been drastically reduced had Texas allowed
exculpatory post-conviction evidence to be entered beyond its 30-
day limit. Under the provisions Texas' new legislation, Butler
would have received DNA testing shortly after learning of its avail-
ability - not 10 years later.
B. Virginia
In February of 1999, the General Assembly of Virginia rejected
legislation that would extend Virginia's "21-day rule" for hearing
new evidence after sentencing.205 However, a reintroduced bill was
passed by the House and Senate and ultimately signed into law by
Governor James Gilmore on May 5, 2001.206 Under the new legis-
lation, all biological evidence collected or obtained during the pros-
ecution of a prisoner who was convicted of a felony but not
198 TEX. RULE App. PROC. § 31(a)(1) (1992).
199 See Science and the Hangman, supra note 120.
200 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
201 See Sharon Cohen and Paul Shepard, Law, Science at Odds over DNA
Evidence, THE SUNDAY GAZEtTE MAIL, Oct. 8. 2000, at 4A.
202 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
203 See Cohen and Shepard, supra note 201.
204 See Hearings, supra note 11 (statement of Peter Neufeld).
205 See The Case for Inhocence: Four Cases, Frontline, http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/case/cases/, (visited Oct. 25, 2000). At 21 days, Vir-
ginia's evidence limit was the strictest in the nation. See also Clines, supra note 40.
206 See generally Michael Sluss and Laurence Hammack, Gilmore Ends DNA
Time Limit; 'People Who are Wrongly Convicted Must Have a Fair Opportunity to
Prove Their Innocence', ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, May 3, 2001, at Al.
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sentenced to death must be preserved for fifteen years.20 7 The
court, in its discretion, may order that the evidence be retained for
a longer period.20 8 In cases involving a death sentence, all biologi-
cal evidence must be retained until the judgment is executed. 20 9
The new legislation also allows a convicted prisoner to apply
for a new scientific investigation of any biological evidence related
to his or her conviction if: the evidence was not known or available
at the time of conviction 210 or the evidence was not tested because
the technology was not available at the time of conviction;211 the
evidence is subject to "a chain of custody sufficient to establish that
the evidence has not been altered, tampered with, or substi-
tuted";212 the testing is "materially relevant, noncumulative, and
necessary" in proving the prisoner's innocence; 213 the testing in-
volves a method employed by the Division of Forensic Science;21 4
and the prisoner has not reasonably delayed the filing of the peti-
tion for testing.215
While the new law will be welcomed by Virginia prisoners who
claim they can prove their innocence through DNA testing, it is too
late to help Joseph Roger O'Dell, who was executed in July of
1997.216 O'Dell was arrested in 1985 for murder, rape and sod-
omy.217 He was convicted of these crimes based mainly on blood
evidence and testimony of a jailhouse "snitch. '218 After his convic-
tion and sentence of death, O'Dell made unsuccessful appeals to
the Virginia Supreme Court, Virginia Federal District Court, and
the U.S. Supreme Court.219 During the U.S. Supreme Court ap-
peal, Justice Harry Blackmun dissented by stating that there were
"serious questions as to whether O'Dell committed the crime" and
warned of "the gross injustice that would result if an innocent man
were sentenced to death." 220
207 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(A) (2001).
208 Id.
209 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(B).
210 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(I).
211 Id.
212 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(II).
213 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(III).
214 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(IV).
215 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(A)(V).
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After his conviction, O'Dell learned of the availability of DNA
testing and began petitioning the Virginia Circuit Court for the re-
lease of evidence for testing. 221 O'Dell's requests were denied, and
he was executed in 1997.222 Questioning his guilt, several anti-
death penalty groups continued to push for DNA testing even after
O'Dell's death.223 The courts denied their requests and "suggested
that the evidence be disposed of as required by law. '224 In March
of 2000, without ever being submitted for DNA testing, the evi-
dence that could have settled all of the questions regarding O'Dell's
guilt or innocence was destroyed.22 5
Not all Virginia inmates who were denied post-conviction
DNA testing were as unlucky as O'Dell. Earl Washington, Jr., a
mentally retarded farmhand, was pardoned in September of 2000
after spending 17 years in prison for a murder he did not commit.
226
During most of those 17 years, Washington's lawyers struggled to
prove his innocence through DNA evidence. 227 Washington was
within nine days of his execution in 1994 when his death sentence
was commuted to life by Governor L. Douglas Wilder.228 The Gov-
ernor commuted the sentence when an initial DNA test raised
doubts about Washington's guilt.229 Washington was pardoned be-
cause state officials insisted that the test was not fully conclusive.2 30
After pushing for six years for additional DNA testing, a new test
proved that it was a known convicted rapist that had actually com-
mitted the crime. 23
1
This was where Washington's luck ran out. Wilder refused to
also recommend parole for a separate assault conviction Washing-
ton received which carried a 30-year sentence.232 State officials are
recalculating his remaining sentence to see whether he may now be
eligible for parole.233 Washington's lawyers contend that had he
not been wrongfully convicted on the murder charge, he would










231 See Clines, supra note 40.
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233 Id.
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have been released from jail on the assault charge due to good be-
havior several years ago.
234
PART VI: CONCLUSION
It is clear that without federal legislation requiring the availa-
bility of post-conviction DNA testing and the preservation of evi-
dence, the integrity of our current system of justice will continue to
suffer. The presumption of innocence is a fundamental premise of
the American criminal justice system.235 If we do not take all ap-
propriate measures necessary to fairly, efficiently and justly deter-
mine one's guilt or innocence, this premise is severely undermined.
Without the safeguards provided for in the Act, more prisoners
claiming their innocence will be left with executive clemency or par-
don as their only hope for justice.
If the Act is passed, a prisoner with exculpatory evidence of his
innocence will be able to present that evidence to a court of law.
236
Not only would a prisoner with proof of his or her innocence be
exonerated of the crimes for which he or she was convicted, but it is
possible that such testing would lead to the determination of the
person who actually committed the crime.
While critics are quick to raise the possibility of flooded courtrooms
and high costs of DNA testing, their claims are quickly refuted by
looking to the states which have adopted measures similar to those
provided for in the Act.237 However, even if the courts would be
busy hearing cases previously settled years ago and states would be
forced to pay for DNA testing for indigents, these problems should
not be more troubling than the risk of executing an innocent man or
woman.23
8
It is highly doubtful that the Framers of the Constitution would
have considered overburdened courts and potential costs involving
evidentiary testing to outweigh a person's due process rights.
239
234 Id.
235 See Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer).
236 See generally DWYER ET. AL., supra note 9, at 218-219.
237 See Hearings, supra note 5 (statement of Honorable William D.
Delahunt).
238 See Hearings, supra note 18 (statement of Eliot Spitzer) (stating "[t]he
United States always has demonstrated its basic commitment of fairness to the
accused, and therefore any marginal burdens are far outweighed by the ability to
prevent the punishment of the innocent").
239 See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The United States has taken much pride on the fairness and accu-
racy of its Constitution and criminal justice system. Although the
United States is one of the last modern countries still endorsing the
death penalty,240 by adopting the Act, the U.S. can continue to en-




240 See, e.g., Yoffie, supra note 27 (stating that "[t]he United States is the only
Western democracy that still carries out executions. Since 1976, 41 other countries
have abolished the death penalty").
241 See, e.g., New Survey Shows Overwhelming Majority Supports Changes to
Death Penalty: Democratic and Republican Lawmakers Release Poll Showing 80%
Support Reform to Capital Punishment System (visited Oct. 25, 2000) http://jus-
tice.policy.net/proactive/newsroom/release.vtml, (visited Oct. 25, 2000) (quoting
Senator Gordon Smith (R-OR) as stating "[t]he Innocence Protection Act will
achieve [the ideal of equal justice for all] by employing out most advanced scien-
tific knowledge and by requiring competent legal counsel in capital cases. Most
importantly, the Innocence Protection Act accomplishes this without weakening
law enforcement's ability to capture, try, and, if necessary, execute those who are
truly guilty.").
